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Trade and the Competitiveness Agenda
José Guilherme Reis and Thomas Farole
Export-Led Growth, the Crisis, and the End 
of an Era
The dramatic expansion in global trade over recent decades
has contributed significantly to diversification, growth, and
poverty reduction in many developing countries. This period
of rapid export growth has been enabled by two critical
structural changes in global trade: (1) the vertical and spatial
fragmentation  of  manufacturing  into  highly  integrated
“global production networks,” and (2) the rise of services
trade and the growth of “offshoring.” Both of these, in turn,
were made possible by major technological revolutions; and
they were supported by multilateral trade policy reforms
and broad liberalizations in domestic trade and investment
environments worldwide.
The global economic crisis came crashing into the middle
of this long-running export-led growth party during 2008
and 2009. Between the last quarter of 2007 and the second
quarter of 2009, global trade contracted by 36 percent. But
as the recovery started to strengthen in 2010 (at least until
the clouds began to form over Europe), the longer-term im-
pacts of the crisis on the policy environment regarding trade
and growth were becoming more apparent. Indeed, in addi-
tion to raising concerns over the global commitment to trade
liberalization, the crisis has also led to some serious rethink-
ing  of  some  of  the  conventional  wisdom  regarding  the
growth agenda—the most important result of which is the
likelihood that governments will play a much more activist
role in the coming years. There are three principal reasons
why governments are likely to be more actively involved in
industrial and trade policy in the coming years. 
First, the crisis has undone faith in markets and discred-
ited laissez-faire approaches that rely simply on trade policy
liberalization. Instead, governments and local markets have
been “rediscovered.” In this sense, the demand for activist
government is likely to go well beyond financial markets and
regulation, and it will affect the policy environment in which
trade and industrial strategies are designed.
Second, the crisis has highlighted the critical importance
of diversification (of sectors, products, and trading partners)
in reducing the risks of growth volatility. The recent era of
globalization contributed to substantial specialization of
The global economic crisis has forced a major rethinking of the respective roles of governments and markets in the
processes of trade and growth. Indeed, industrial policy seems to be back in fashion—or, at least, talking about it is.
But a renewed “activism” by government in the trade and growth agenda need not mean a return to old-style
policies of import substitution and “picking winners.” Instead, it may mean a stronger focus on competitiveness by
unlocking the constraints to private sector–led growth. This note discusses the renewed role of government in trade
and growth policy from the competitiveness angle, and it suggests some priorities for the new competitiveness agenda.
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The first years of the 21st century were characterized by more prudent macroeconomic policies in the developing world, the positive impact of debt 
relief on low-income countries (LICs), and positive growth trends for the world economy, despite the puncturing of the high-tech “bubble” in OECD 
countries. Until the eve of the financial crisis, many emerging economies were able to reduce the vulnerabilities of their debt portfolios and debt 
management was being carried out under favorable circumstances. Average maturities increased, reflecting increases in the maturities of new debt 
issuances, and rollover risks declined. Moreover, the increased availability of local currency financing, reflecting the development of domestic capi-
tal markets, and the globalization of the corporate sector in emerging economies underscored the changing landscape of development financing. 
The current global financial crisis is changing this landscape 
once again. Since 2007, the world economy has slowed signifi-
cantly: global output declined 0.6 percent (a 3.2 percent con-
traction in advanced economies) in 2009, and although the 
global economy is expected to return to a positive growth path 
in  2010  (4.2  percent),  future  prospects  remain  uncertain 
(World Bank 2010). Moreover, advanced economies are ex-
pected to face large public debts, rising real interest rates, and 
slower growth. The International Monetary Fund (IMF), for 
example, projects that annual gross domestic product (GDP) 
potential growth rates in advanced countries will be about a 
half percentage point less, on average, than precrisis levels if 
public debt is not lowered (IMF 2010a). 
There is broad consensus that many dangers lie ahead in 
terms of the sustainability of the recovery, including challenges 
in implementing exit strategies from the massive government 
interventions that have taken place since 2008 (Primo Braga 
2010). Despite the first signs of attenuation of the crisis in the 
third quarter of 2009, economic indicators still point to signifi-
cant levels of unemployment and social distress around the 
world. This crisis has not yet evolved into a systemic sovereign 
debt crisis,2 however, the rapid accumulation of public debt and 
growing fiscal imbalances in many countries, as well as histori-
cal precedent, suggest that the possibility cannot be ignored. 
Interestingly enough, for the first time in over 40 years, con-
cerns about debt sustainability seem to be concentrated in 
high-income economies. It is true that developing economies 
entered this crisis in a much stronger financial position, reflect-
ing  better  macroeconomic  policies,  improved  debt  manage-
ment practices, and, in the case of heavily indebted poor coun-
tries, debt relief. Still, the severity of the crisis and the growing 
tensions in public debt markets in Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries emphasize 
that there is no room for complacency. This note documents 
evolving debt and fiscal trends and identifies some of the emerg-
ing challenges faced by debt managers in developing markets. 
Emerging Issues 
Figure 1 captures debt and fiscal variables for selected advanced 
and emerging countries in 2007, immediately before the onset 
of the current financial crisis. As illustrated by the location of a 
large number of economies in the right quadrant of the graph—
with fiscal surpluses and debt-to-GDP ratios below 60 percent—
many countries were able to respond to the crisis from a posi-
tion of strength. Figure 2 shows that by the end of 2009, the 
picture had changed significantly, with many countries now dis-
playing fiscal deficits of more than 5 percent and debt-to-GDP 2  POVERTY REDUCTION AND ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT (PREM) NETWORK      www.worldbank.org/economicpremise
ratios well above 60 percent. In other words, the scope for fur-
ther expansionary interventions, be it on the monetary or on 
the fiscal fronts, is now much more limited. The situation is par-
ticularly complex in some of the countries in the eurozone, 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on IMF 2010a.
Note: Debt measures for República Bolivariana de Venezuela are external debt (all other countries are measured in general government gross debt). 
Figure 1. General Government Balance and General Government Gross Debt, 2007 (% of GDP)
where existing social entitlements and low productivity 
growth prospects make debt-to-GDP reduction exercises 
quite difficult. 
Confidence in the strength of the recovery of advanced 
economies remains a question and the process of delever-
aging of the private sector in many OECD countries is on-
going. Accordingly, although the debate about the proper 
timing to unwind public interventions remains fierce (see, 
for example, Hannoun [2009]); it was clear by May 2010 
that developments in European markets had increased the 
need for credible plans for fiscal consolidation. 
Given  the  growing  levels  of  debt,  several  questions 
emerge, including: What if the fiscal stimulus programs 
were to continue for two to four years more than currently 
projected? What will happen to public debt if there is no 
adjustment to the primary fiscal balances in the medium 
term? What is the degree of fiscal adjustment necessary for 
countries to either reduce their public debt stock to his-
torical average levels or stabilize it around a certain fiscally 
sustainable target? If the adjustment is deemed too large to 
be feasible from a political economy standpoint, what will 
be the effect of a more gradual adjustment on debt sustain-
ability? While this paper does not aim to answer these im-
portant questions, some preliminary findings have already 
started to appear in the literature. A recent study conduct-
ed on a sample of 20 middle-income countries (MICs), for 
example, shows that the fiscal policy responses in 2008 and 
2009 and the related external financing packages have contrib-
uted to higher public and external debts in several countries 
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on IMF 2010a.
Note: Debt measures for República Bolivariana de Venezuela are external debt (all other 
countries are measured in general government gross debt).
Figure 2. General Government Balance and General Government Gross Debt, 
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Hypothetical scenarios that were examined in this study—
to assess the staying power of the fiscal stimulus programs in 
the sample countries—suggest that if a growth recovery is not 
sustained in advanced countries and the global outlook re-
mains fragile, the primary balances that most of these coun-
tries will need to run in the medium term will be significantly 
higher than what they have carried in the recent past. More-
over, if the prolonged downturn leads to even more debt accu-
mulation, if rising international interest rates, foreign exchange 
risk, and a continuous repricing of risk of sovereign credits 
characterize the new postcrisis reality, it will become more dif-
ficult for several countries to reach their respective debt targets 
(figure 4).  
In the case of LICs, the global financial crisis has also impact-
ed  their  debt  positions  and  associated  vulnerabilities.  This 
group of countries is likely to face tighter external financing—
dwindling foreign direct investment, commercial lending, and 
(potentially) smaller aid flows—and contractions in export in-
come. Several of the LICs have increased their reliance on do-
mestic debt to close their widening fiscal financing needs. A 
recent joint World Bank and IMF study reviewed debt sustain-
ability analyses (DSAs) for 32 LICs for which pre-and postcrisis 
DSAs were available. Like the MICs, the external and fiscal fi-
nancing requirements of LICs also increased after the global 
crisis (World Bank and IMF 2010). In addition, their future lev-
els of GDP, exports, and fiscal revenues are expected to be per-
manently lower as a result of this global shock. The World Bank 
and IMF (2010) conclude that, on average, LIC debt ratios are 
also expected to deteriorate in the near term, particularly for 
public debt. 
Meanwhile, the surge in gross borrowing needs of advanced 
economies—from US$9 trillion in 2007 to roughly US$16 tril-
lion in 2009, with an expected similar level for 2010—is add-
ing to the financial stress under which public debt is being 
managed (Blommestein and Gok 2009). If general govern-
ment debt ratios in advanced economies are to be brought 
back to the precrisis average of 60 percent of GDP by 2030, it 
will require an 8 percent swing in the fiscal balance from an 
average deficit of 4 percent in 2010 to a fiscal surplus of 4 per-
cent by 2020 and then maintenance of this surplus for the en-
suing decade (Lipsky 2010). The growing level of public debt 
suggests that the spread between long-term and short-term in-
terest rates is likely to increase over time, even though quantita-
tive easing may delay such a trend. For developing countries, 
this is likely to imply higher borrowing costs and shortening 
maturities on new borrowings. Developing countries will be 
impacted by these developments not only through the cost of 
capital and reduced  global economic dynamism, but also be-
cause the massive public interventions of the last two years—in 
the absence of an orderly unwinding—will foster asset bubbles 
and speculative waves. Exchange rate misalignments can also 
contribute to the tensions in the financial system. Speculative 
attacks against currencies in highly leveraged economies can 
add to risks by further contributing to the deterioration of pri-
vate sector balance sheets and may evolve into sovereign debt 
crises. All of these risks need to be managed on a continuous 
basis, and risk management should be accompanied by credi-
ble, medium-term debt management practices and financing 
strategies to support the fiscal spending and postcrisis recovery 
efforts. 
Figure 3. Increased External and Public Debt Levels in MICs (% of GDP)
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Adopting a Sovereign Balance Sheet  
Approach 
This review of debt and fiscal paths underscores the impor-
tance of refocusing on sovereign debt management. The tradi-
tional, external DSAs will continue to be an important ingredi-
ent of the analytical toolkit, but they need to be complemented 
by a closer examination of public debt (encompassing both do-
mestic and external debt) and medium-term fiscal sustainabil-
ity analyses by the respective authorities on a regular basis. Spe-
cial attention will now need to be given to managing not only 
the composition of sovereign debt portfolios, but also the ex-
panding array of contingent liabilities incurred by government 
responses to the crisis. 
Conventional DSAs for low- and middle-income countries 
highlight country-specific characteristics, focusing on the na-
ture and size of shocks that affect a country’s debt and debt 
service profile, and the potential for fiscal response to these 
shocks, given fiscal space at any point in time. However, the les-
sons from the East Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s and 
the current global financial crisis emphasize the need for DSAs 
to consider the wider liabilities of the public sector. Countries 
with high sovereign debt ratios, large fiscal deficits, and growing 
contingent liabilities are especially at risk of contagion because 
heightened market uncertainties in international capital mar-
kets lead to a flight to quality. Investors are wary of rising inter-
est rates across countries and the prospect of stringent fiscal 
consolidation that lies ahead. 
The ability of governments to make payments on their debt 
obligations (domestic and external) and minimize future risks 
to their public finances can be enhanced by implementing a 
credible, medium-term debt management strategy and creat-
ing an institutional capability to monitor and manage contin-
gent liabilities. To this end, a sovereign balance sheet approach 
to debt management will be useful in managing the financial 
and credit risks associated with carrying out regulatory and 
macroeconomic functions. This approach focuses on the risk 
characteristics of the assets and obligations that the govern-
ment manages, and the types of financial flows associated with 
them.  In practice, this entails an examination of the cash flows 
generated by the key assets (or asset classes) of the government 
and  monetary  authorities  to  see  how  sensitive  they  are  to 
changes in real interest rates, currency movements, and shifts 
in terms of trade (Wheeler 2004, chapter 4). 
Conclusion 
The coordination of exit policies from the massive fiscal inter-
ventions of the last few years will pose major challenges for gov-
ernments around the world. While simultaneous fiscal expan-
sion helped thwart the global economic slowdown of 2008–9, 
the story is more complicated when it comes to unwinding 
these fiscal programs and moving toward a path of fiscal con-
solidation. Simultaneous fiscal consolidation is likely to con-
strain the dimensions of economic recovery, at least in the ini-
tial stages of fiscal retrenchment. If the fiscal consolidation is 
Sources: Van Doorn, Suri, and Gooptu forthcoming; IMF 2010b.
Note: Assumptions: debt target is 40 percent of GDP by 2020 if the country’s gross public debt was above 40 percent of GDP at end-2009, or to stabilize debt at its end-2009 
level if debt was below 40 percent of GDP at end-2009. Adjustment is the difference between the required primary balance to reach the debt target under the two hypothetical 
scenarios and the country-specific historical primary balance (that is, average of 1996–2001 for countries marked with an asterisk; average of 2002–07 for all other countries). For 
Chile, Indonesia, South Africa and Nigeria the historical primary balance is larger than the required primary balance, so, in principle, no unprecedented fiscal adjustment will be 
needed in these countries.
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focused on stabilizing entitlement spending–to-GDP ratios (a 
must for countries facing demographic pressures) and letting 
discretionary interventions expire, the required adjustment 
can be achieved. However, the difficulties of dealing with enti-
tlement reforms (for example, pension and health reforms) 
and the temptation to postpone adjustment because of contin-
ued weaknesses in the private sector (reflecting the ongoing 
deleveraging process) exacerbate the challenges of fiscal con-
solidation. 
Markets will be closely monitoring the evolution of fiscal po-
sitions around the world, and economies that are not able to 
implement consolidation plans will face increasing difficulties 
in financing their debts. In this context, international coordina-
tion (and monitoring) can play a positive role in helping en-
hance the credibility of national strategies and by giving “am-
munition” to financial authorities to resist short-term pressures 
associated with political cycles. 
Finally, because of the increasing importance of public infra-
structure spending in renewing the growth process through the 
issuance of sovereign guarantees and/or by the reliance on pub-
lic-private  partnerships,  the  role  of  contingent  liabilities  re-
quires renewed attention. Contingent liabilities may pose sub-
stantial balance sheet risks for governments, as demonstrated 
by the East Asian financial crisis in 1997. When contingent li-
abilities are realized, they become a potential source of future 
call on tax revenues and can be a major factor in the build-up of 
public sector debt. Experience shows that contingent liabilities 
associated with capital injections into the banking system or in 
the recapitalization of public sector enterprises are particularly 
important  (Wheeler 2004, chapter 6). The rapid build-up of 
public debt that has occurred in advanced countries, and is 
now occurring in MICs, is highly correlated with these “hidden 
deficits.” 
Experiences of many countries, such as Colombia, Hunga-
ry, New Zealand, South Africa, and Sweden, suggest that a gov-
ernment’s exposure to contingent liabilities can be substantial-
ly  reduced  through  better,  more  complete  monitoring  and 
reporting; better risk-sharing arrangements; improved gover-
nance and regulatory regimes; and sound economic policies 
that  minimize  the  possibility  of  these  contingent  liabilities 
from being realized in the first place. Debt managers around 
the world will have to pay close attention to the evolution of 
contingent liabilities and their impact on public debt to avoid 
surprises. 
Notes
1. This paper relies extensively on Primo Braga (2010) and Van 
Doorn, Suri, and Gooptu (forthcoming). 
2.  There  is  extensive  literature  on  the  correlation  between 
banking crises and sovereign debt crises. See, for example, Rein-
hart and Rogoff (2009).
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